Abstract-This paper presents several advances for the PMU placement problem (PPP). Existing approaches have difficulty scaling to full-scale systems, and are not guaranteed to be resilient to multiple component failures. This paper expands PPP to a more general k-resilient PPP, where any k PMUs and/or lines can fail without jeopardizing the problem's full supervision criterion. Our PPP model -a novel formulation based on maximumflow network design -is unique in that it is amenable to efficient decomposition, which significantly improves tractability and scalability. We present two cutting plane algorithms to support this decomposition -the first such algorithms for the PPP to our knowledge. The improvements in computational efficiency afforded by the network decomposition suggest that our approach can solve the PPP for large-scale systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Phasor measurement units (PMUs) are instruments that are placed at electric buses in order to provide real-time monitoring, data measurement, and supervision capabilities. These devices are increasingly used by system designers and engineers to measure voltage and current phasors across the grid. The data provided by these units support system analysis studies, reliability assessments in normal operating scenarios, and contingency operations during failure scenarios. They can also be utilized for monitoring purposes in security scenarios where the integrity of the grid is under threat by an adversary -for example, in the context of a cyber security attack.
To support these uses, individual PMUs must be placed across a grid at locations necessary to provide the requisite supervision. A PMU provides voltage phasor at the installed bus and current phasors for incident lines. Because electric grids are considered safety-critical systems, it is desirable to ensure that a sufficient number of PMUs are placed within the grid to provide full supervision. This is generically referred to as the PMU placement problem (PPP) [3] .
Direct measurement of all system states is possible if PMUs are placed at all buses. However, this approach is not optimal as it is unnecessarily expensive and cumbersome in that it provides excessive redundant measurement data that must be captured and processed by the supervisory control system.
A better approach would be to identify a minimum number of PMUs to install in order to satisfy the condition of complete supervision. Existing approaches to this problem have presented integer programming formulations that are variants of cover problems like the Dominating Set Problem (DSP) [3] , [8] . Solution approaches vary from search algorithms (e.g., [4] , [10] ), to heuristics (e.g., [9] ), to solving linear integer programs directly (e.g., [1] , [5] , [6] , [14] ). Furthermore, because it is desirable to maintain full supervision in the event of failing or compromised PMUs and/or lines, several variants of this problem have been cast as contingency-constraint problems where full supervision is maintained in the event of a singleelement contingency scenario (e.g., [1] , [11] ). However, these existing variants of PPP are only capable of guaranteeing full supervision when no more than one system component fails. This paper makes several advances to PPP. First, we present a more general k-failure resilient variant of PPP, referred to as RPPP. This model advances previous approaches by generating PMU placement schemes that will maintain full supervision in the event of any k PMU and/or line failures. Second, we present an alternative formulation, which yields linear secondstage problems, and therefore, linear recourse functions. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to propose a new formulation for RPPP based on maximum-flow network design, as most existing approaches in the literature formulate RPPP (for k = 1) as variants of DSP. The maximum-flow formulation supports efficient decomposition, and thus, has the potential to solve large-scale systems -even if k is non-trivial. In contrast, existing models cannot be decomposed efficiently, meaning that the integer programs that must be solved are exponentially large in terms of the number of variables and constraints. Third, this paper presents two cutting plane algorithms to support this decomposition. These algorithms are, to the best of our knowledge, the first decomposition algorithms for the PPP and the RPPP. The empirical results presented show significant improvements in computational efficiency in terms of both speed and memory. This promising result suggests that our approach can solve the PPP for regional, or even national, scale electric grid systems.
II. PMU PLACEMENT FORMULATIONS
A power system instance is represented by an undirected graph G(V, E). For notational convenience, we may write e = {u, v} to denote the fact that lines are defined between buses u, v ∈ V . Since a PMU placed at bus u can measure the current phasor of an incident line e = {u, v}, we define G(V, A) to be the digraph that is obtained by introducing a pair of antiparallel arcs e + = (u, v) and e − = (v, u) for every line e = {u, v} ∈ E and self-joining arcs (v, v) for all v ∈ V . Therefore, A := {e + = (u, v), e − = (v, u)|e = {u, v} ∈ E} ∪ {(v, v)|v ∈ V } and let a be its index.
In consideration of contingency constraints, let the set of all size k contingencies be defined as follows.
Letd c ∈ {0, 1} |E|+|V | be the contingency vector, for all c = 1, · · · , |C| and let C be the contingency-scenario index set.
For all models, δ e are binary parameters that take value 1 if the PMU at bus v and line e are part of contingency c and 0 otherwise, respectively. Finally, let x v be a binary variable that takes value 1 if a PMU is installed at node v and 0 otherwise. Let y a be a binary variable that takes value 1 if the PMU installed at the source node of arc a is used to observe the target node of arc a and 0 otherwise. Let w a be a binary variable that takes value 1 if the zero-injection property of the source node of arc a is used to observe the target node of arc a and 0 otherwise.
The contingency-constrained formulation with consideration for zero-injection buses and measurement limitations, Resilient Dominating Set Problem (RDS), is as follows.
The objective (2a) is to minimize the number of PMUs installed. For each contingency scenario c ∈ C, a set of constraints enforce the full system supervision criterion. Constraints (2b) are observability constraints for each buscontingency pair. Bus v is observable by a local PMU, a PMU installed at an incident bus via w c a , or through the zero-injection bus property via y c a . Constraints (2d) enforce measurement limitations at each bus. If a line fails, constraints (2e) state that PMU(s) installed at the from bus and/or to bus of e cannot be used to measure the current phasor of the line.
Analogously, the zero injection property cannot be used to infer the voltage phasor of an incident bus.
Practically, the number of contingencies grows so quickly that RDS (2) is likely to be intractable, even for modestsized systems and k. Additionally, despite the L-shaped block structure of its constraint matrix, Figure ( Next, we present an alternative formulation, based on network design, with a linear recourse function.
A. Maximum-Flow Network Design
The network design problem is defined on a digraph D(V , A ). For clarity of exposition, we first demonstrate the reformulation using a simple 4-bus system ( Figure 2 ). We begin by defining the key components of this reformulation: two special nodes, a source node s and a terminal node t, and two sets of directed arcs. For each bus v ∈ V in the original power system, define arc (s, p v ) with a flow capacity ofm v and arc (t v , t) with unit flow capacity. Arc (s, p v ) represents a PMU installation at bus v ∈ V . A unit flow on arc (t v , t) represents observability of bus v. The augmented maximumflow network of the 4-bus system is shown in Figure 3 . Due to space constraints, we summarize the descriptions of all other arcs and nodes in 
A p , A d and A r represent the sets of PMU placement arcs, line arcs, and residual arcs,
Let f a be the flow on arc a. Then, RPPP can be formulated as a resilient maximum-flow network design problem (RND).
The objective of (3a) is to minimize the number of PMU "arcs" built. For each contingency scenario c, define a set of constraints to enforce observability of all buses by forcing a unit flow on arcs into terminal node t (3b). Constraints (3c) are flow balance constraints for all nodes other than nodes s and t. Constraints (3d) enforce measurement limitations at each bus. If a transmission line fails, constraints (3e) state that flow on arc a ∈ A d must be zero. Finally, constraints (3f) enforce capacity constraints on the rest of the arcs. the structure of the constraint matrix of RND (3) . In contrast to the RDS structure (Figure 1 ), the new formulation yields linear second-stage problems and thus, linear recourse function.
III. SOLUTION APPROACHES
RDS and RND will typically have extremely large numbers of variables and constraints because they grow with the number of contingency scenarios, which increases exponentially with |V | + |E| and k. For large power systems and/or a contingency budget k greater than one, RDS and RND rapidly become computationally intractable for increasing system size.
A. Benders Decomposition
One alternative formulation utilizes |V | binary variables but possibly an exponential number of constraints. We use linear programming duality to generate valid inequalities for the projection of the natural formulation onto the space of the PMU placement variables x.
Let z(x,d 
where L c is the set of extreme points of the dual of constraints (3c) -(3f). We enforce all constraints for the no-failure scenario explicitly. For all contingency scenarios c ∈ C, constraint set (4) ensures that the system is fully observable. By using a Benders decomposition (BD), we are able to decompose the extremely large formulation (3) into a master problem and multiple subproblems. In theory, this enables us to solve larger instances, which would not be possible by a direct solution of RDS and RND. For a detailed treatment of BD please refer to [2] .
B. Implicit Contingency Screening
Given a non-trivial k, the sizes of most systems in operation may preclude direct solution of (3). Even using BD may not be tractable because each contingency scenario must be considered explicitly. Our goal is to instead use a separation oracle that implicitly evaluates all contingency scenarios and either identifies a violated one, a contingency with k failures that renders a part of the system unobservable, or certifies that no such contingency scenario exists.
1) Maximum Flow Separation Problem: Givenx, we solve a Maximum-Flow Separation Problem (MSP) to determine the maximum observability under the worst-case contingency scenario with k failures. In this bilevel program, the upperlevel decisions d correspond to binary contingency-selection decisions and the lower-level decisions f correspond to maximum flows relative tox and d. MSP(x) is given as follows.
The objective (5a) is to minimize the maximum flow into terminal node t. Given d, the goal of the system operator (inner minimization) is to determine the optimal flow such that system observability is maximized. Constraint (5b) limits the total number of system elements that can be in a contingency. Next, we outline an algorithm for solving RND that combines a BD with the aid of the separation oracle given by (5 Solve PSP(x t ,d
IV. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We implemented our approach in C++ and CPLEX 12.4-ILOG Concert Technology 2.9. All experiments ran on a machine with a 2.93 GHz Xeon processor and 32 GB memory. We tested our approach on five systems: 30-bus, 57-bus, RTS 96, 118-bus, and WECC 240-bus [12] usingm v = 3 ∀v ∈ V . For each system, we considered contingency budgets k = 0, 1, 2 and enforced a maximum runtime of 7200 seconds.
In order to ensure feasibility for k = 2, we made the simplifying assumption that PMUs installed at buses with less than k + 1 incident lines cannot fail. We also added sets of valid inequalities derived from connectivity requirements. Table II provides the runtime, in CPU seconds, for each instance under the four different approaches. The first two approaches, RDS and RND, solve extensive forms of (2) and (3), respectively. The latter two approaches solve RND using BD and ICS algorithms. OM means that the approach exited with a status of out-of-memory. Note that RDS and RND can only solve the smaller instances. This is because of the sheer size of the problem, in which a full second-stage problem must be embedded within the formulations for each scenario. As the number of scenarios grows, these formulations quickly become intractable. We are working with moderate-sized systems here and target systems will be in the order of thousands of elements, which will make monolithic math programs such as RDS and RND intractable even sooner.
A BD algorithm bypasses the size problem via a delayed cut generation. However, it still suffers from the combinatorial growth in the number of contingency scenarios -for each contingency a PSP must be solved to check for violated feasibility cuts. We see that larger problem instances can be solved, relative to RDS and RND, but the BD algorithm nonetheless cannot solve the largest problem instances. The parenthetical number under column BD indicates the maximum number of observable buses under the worst-case contingency scenario at the end of the two-hour time limit.
With the ICS approach, we see that all instances can be solved, in all cases in approximately 1 minute and frequently in only a few seconds. This is the result of the combination of the strength of the Benders cuts and the strengthening inequalities, enabling the problem to be solved in a small number of iterations, and also the fact that we are able to implicitly evaluate all contingencies quickly and then find feasibility cuts by solving a PSP. The final column of Table  II shows the number of installed PMUs for each instance. Table III shows the optimal PMU placements for the 57- bus and RTS 96 systems. In going from no-contingency to single-element contingency, there is a moderate increase in the number of PMUs installed. However, to protect against two-element failures the number of PMUs installed increased considerably. These results follow intuition since power system topologies are typically sparse [13] , thus as the contingency budget increases more PMUs must be installed locally. Finally, Figure 5 shows that to maintain full observability under k = 2, PMUs must be installed at over 86% of the buses. The four buses with no PMUs are buses 6, 9, 25 and 28. V. CONCLUSION The ability to solve large-scale RPPP is of high consequence -especially as attention on modernizing electric grids has increased. However, the best exact approaches to date consider only single-element failures and cannot scale to practical power-system sizes. This paper makes three key contributions. First, we present a more general k-failure resilient model for PPP called RDS. By supporting PMU layouts that are provably resilient to any k component failures, critical electric grids can be operated with more flexible margins of safety and security, per the needs of individual system operators. Second, we present an alternative formulation for RDS called RND. This formulation, which to the best our knowledge is the first formulation for PPP based on network design rather than variants of cover problems, permits efficient decomposition. Third, we present two cutting plane algorithms for solving RND, which are the first such decomposition algorithms in this domain. Computational results show that systems of moderate sizes can be solved efficiently, in all cases in about one minute, which provide evidence that the approach may be tractable for large-scale regional and national systems.
